Worthy Christian News > War on Terrorism > October 7 Report Finds Major Intelligence Lapses Resulted in Tragic Massacre (Worthy News In-Depth)

October 7 Report Finds Major Intelligence Lapses Resulted in Tragic Massacre (Worthy News In-Depth)

by Emmitt Barry, Worthy News Correspondent

(Worthy News) – Israeli Military Intelligence and the Southern Command ignored more than five warnings, such as new SIM activations in Gaza and unusual Hamas activities. Dismissing these as routine, they overlooked signs of the impending October 7 attack. On this day in 2023, Hamas and other terrorists groups launched an unprecedented invasion from Gaza into southern Israel, coinciding with Simchat Torah and marking the start of the ongoing Gaza war.

The IDF’s findings from the October 7 investigation, though expected, reveal a bleak scenario. A major revelation was the magnitude of the intelligence breakdown, with the surprise and operational disarray on October 7 surpassing even the setbacks of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

In contrast to 1973, when Israel received early warnings of an Arab attack and debated mobilizing reserves amidst clear war signals, this time no such indications were detected.

One of the main investigations concluded, “There was no one who saw or detected any sign of this event in advance, not even at the lowest intelligence level.” It added, “The surprise was total — situational and fundamental — against a strategic deception that lasted years, an operational deception leading up to the attack and a tactical deception throughout the night before the invasion.” There were no discussions about calling up reserves.

The investigation into the events revealed significant shortcomings in Israel’s Unit 8200 intelligence operations, which had long prioritized tracking high-ranking Hamas leaders while neglecting lower-level commanders and operatives. This oversight extended to the numerous communication devices activated on the night of October 7 and throughout the day.

The report noted, “There was no geolocation data from Military Intelligence—not even on October 7—despite thousands of terrorists’ phones and radios operating for hours inside Israel. We were deaf and blind on both sides of October 7, even on Friday afternoon, when Hamas began preparing for the invasion—from dozens of operatives initially briefed on the plan, to hundreds by Friday evening, and to thousands of Gazans overnight.” It was further revealed that one detained terrorist had even managed to make a farewell call to his family and contact his commander in Gaza to report returning for a forgotten RPG.

The conclusion of the investigation emphasized, “Enhanced preparedness could have been achieved without compromising intelligence sources. There was no negligence that night, but there was a rigid mindset—no one understood or declared it a time-sensitive event requiring immediate action. If a single authority had had the full picture that night, it is likely an alert would have been issued.” It highlighted a missed chance for the IDF to adjust longstanding flawed assumptions and potentially disrupt the invasion.

The military admitted that Hamas orchestrated a complex deception across several levels, leading to a fatal ambush, manipulating its “Jericho Wall” defense strategy—a scenario of a potential Hamas attack on Israel.

Moreover, the investigation revealed that during a classified General Staff meeting on July 27, 2022, Brig. Gen. Yaron Finkelman, who later became the IDF’s Southern Command chief on October 7, directed preparations for a conflict with Hamas based on the “Jericho Wall” plans, but ultimately, no actions were implemented.

Despite over 10 warning signs in the two years leading up to the conflict, IDF intelligence did not adjust its assumptions. “We read the signals but we didn’t see what they actually said. There was a false sense of security,” admitted IDF officials. Nonetheless, the investigation found no evidence of negligence or dereliction of duty among the intelligence officers.

Israel’s extensive border defenses along Gaza, both above and below ground, gave rise to a false sense of security and prompted Hamas to devise alternative invasion strategies that circumvented tunnels.

This confidence led to fewer troops being stationed at the border. On October 7, the IDF’s strategy for managing conflicts crumbled along with the belief that attacks could be held at the border fence. “The concept was deeply entrenched—there was no systematic effort to challenge it,” the investigation report stated.

The intelligence failure of October 7 allowed around 6,000 terrorists to infiltrate Israel at 119 different points. According to IDF reports, this group included 3,800 members from the “elite Nukhba forces” along with 2,000 from Hamas and other terrorist organizations.

The tragedy of October 7 resulted in the death of 1,139 individuals, comprising 695 Israeli civilians (including 38 children), 71 foreign nationals, and 373 security personnel.

The Nova music festival was particularly hard hit, with 364 civilians killed and many injured.

Additionally, about 250 Israelis, both civilians and soldiers, were captured and taken to Gaza, either alive or deceased, including 30 children.